6.12 Reading Response

Distributed Cognition & Activity Theory

Texts:
Hutchins, How a Cockpit Remembers Its Speeds

In his article, Hutchins attempts to illustrate distributed cognition by examining the cognitive operations of landing a plane, specifically how pilots coordinate activity, technologies, and media and how this process contributes to the cockpit system. Although his analysis is very long, detailed, and somewhat complicated, I will attempt to briefly summarize here Hutchins’ main points in order to illustrate how they display distributed cognition and ultimately relate to our work in this class.

Distributed CognitionBecause many of us are not familiar with cognitive theories, I decided to do a little research into cognition to provide some background to understand better what Hutchins was talking about. By definition, distributed cognition is “a branch of cognitive science that proposes cognition and knowledge are not confined to an individual; rather, it is distributed across objects, individuals, artefacts, and tools in the environment” (“Distributed Cognition”). This theory views human knowledge and cognition as not being confined to the individual, but rather strewn throughout a system, distributed by placing memories, facts, and/or knowledge on the objects, individuals, and tools in an environment ("Socially distributed cognition”).This system, then, is seen as a set of representations where an interchange of information takes place either in the mental space of participants or external representations in the environment ("Socially distributed cognition”).

This framework looks at the coordination between individuals, artifacts and the environment in order to express cognition as “the processing of information occurring from interaction with symbols in the world” ("Socially distributed cognition”). Its overall goal is to explain “how distributed units are coordinated by analyzing the interactions between individuals, the representational media used, and the environment within which the activity takes place” (“Distributed Cognition”). This ties into how Hutchins mentions that the article presents “a theoretical framework that takes a distributed socio-technical system rather than an individual mind as its primary unit of analysis” (Hutchins 265). Like he mentions, the unit of analysis in distributed cognition focuses on “systems that dynamically reconfigure their sub-systems to accomplish functions individuals, artifacts, their relations to each other” (“Distributed Cognition”).

Therefore, because it emphasizes the social aspects of cognition, the theory of distributed cognition can serve as a “useful descriptive framework that describes human work systems in informational and computational terms” (“Distributed Cognition”), explaining why Hutchins uses the cockpit example as an effective way to show his point.

Key PointsIn his article “How a Cockpit Remembers its Speeds,” Hutchins examines commercial airline cockpits as cognitive systems in an attempt to illustrate that the cognitive properties of systems are not due to the sum of individual processes. He points out that “systems that are larger than an individual may have cognitive properties in their own right that cannot be reduced to the cognitive properties of individual persons” (Hutchins 266). Hutchins further argues that “rather than trying to map the findings of cognitive psychological studies of individuals directly onto the individual pilots in the cockpit, we should map the conceptualization of the cognitive system onto a new unit of analysis: the cockpit as a whole" (267).

To then demonstrate this, Hutchins continues with his own analysis of the cockpit. He points out certain cockpit operations and interactions deal with how “information is represented and how representations are transformed and propagated through the system” (Hutchins 286-7). In a thoroughly abridged summary of his analysis, Hutchins explains that pilots must perform a variety of operations in order to land a plane safely, including decreasing speed, maintaining lift, and changing the shape of the wings. These operations involve a range of cognitive, perceptual and memory tasks. Thus, in order to do all of these, he describes that a variety of things take place in the cockpit: calculating proper speeds based on weight, handling and setting physical markers (speed cards and bugs), looking at dials and instruments, verbal communication, etc.

Let’s look at memory tasks as an example. While memory is normally thought to be an individual and internal psychological function, memory processes can actually be distributed among human agents or between them and external representational devices (Hutchins 284). In the case of the cockpit, while the memory process emerges from the activity of the pilots, so much of the memory function takes place outside of the individual (286). The “memory tasks in the cockpit may be accomplished by functional systems which transcend the boundaries of the individual actor” (Hutchins 284).  Instead of being primarily individual, remembering is a function of the system. It is achieved through interaction of the pilots and factors in their environment.

The pilots use both internal and external cognitive representations, the latter resulting from the system’s representations and media. There are a variety of devices that participate in this functional system to accomplish memory tasks. Hutchins explains that these things, such as the physical markers and verbal exchanges, are not simply memory aids, but devices that permit reconfigurations of functional systems. For example, adding speed bugs to systems doesn’t alter the participants’ memories, but instead permits “a different set of processes to be assembled into a functional system that achieves the same results” (Hutchins 283). The speed bugs don’t actually help the pilots remember speeds; they are part of the process for how the cockpit system remembers speeds (283).

Technological devices, interactions, and representations of different media affect the flow of information and give the cockpit system its unique properties (286, 287). All together, the way these various elements  interact and function within the cockpit system allow the operations necessary to land safely be distributed not individually, but across the system temporally, socially, spatially, and perceptually. By distributing these various operations between participants and objects, individuals are assigned less tasks and can more easily manage them. Hutchins says “a change in the nature of the representation of information results in a change in the nature of the cognitive task facing the pilot” (283). A distribution of cognitive labor between pilots and devices makes the demands made on the individuals are more easily managed.

In somewhat of a summary, Hutchins is arguing that cognitive activity is not exclusively internal so we cannot look at it individually. Rather it relies on the situational environment so we must look at it as a functional system, paying attention to all of the actors, representations, and media at play.

Connections to Activity Theory Hutchins’ point of transferring the focus from an individual to larger system ties in directly to our study of activity systems. He attempts to illustrate how factors in an environment can provide various necessary parts, and I recognized how many of the things he points out could be identified as part of an activity system. For example, the pilots could be seen as the subjects and the motivation or outcome would be landing the plane safely. Mediating tools would be the various devices they use, such as the speed bugs and cards and also their verbal communication. Rules would be some of their memory (or past experience) about how to land the plane, also the necessary speeds and weights, and aviation regulations. The division of labor would be how all of the necessary operations are distributed among the crew and their technologies/media. These are just a few of the things I notice, but obviously there are many more. Either way, how distributed cognition looks at the representation, transformation, and dissemination of information across a system is much like how we look at all of the elements in an activity system. It is how they all work together that we should focus on to understand it, not just one individual part. By looking at systems as a whole, through either perspective, we can better analyze and understand various parts of the system and how they interact and play a role in the larger situation.

Works Cited
“Distributed Cognition (DCog).” Learning-Theories.com Knowledge Base and Webliography. Learning Theories, n.d. Web. 11 June 2012. <http://www.learning-theories.com/distributed-cognition-dcog.html>.

Hutchins, Edwin. “How a Cockpit Remembers Its Speeds.” Cognitive Science 19 (1995): 265-288. Print.

"Socially distributed cognition." Wikipedia: The Free Encyclopedia. Wikimedia Foundation, Inc. 24 March 2012. Web. 11 June 2012. <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Socially_distributed_cognition>.

5.22 Reading Response

Texts:
Russell, “Looking Beyond the Interface”
Ding, NIH

Activity Systems & Theory
I feel that both of these articles helped me to better understand activity systems and activity theory. We were able to get a better explanation of what these are and to see them illustrated.

We are always engaging in collective activity because human behavior is social in origin and thus human activity is collective (Russell 66). No written product exists in isolation (Ding 43). However, activity can be widely distributed in time and space and is mediated by complex networks of tools (Russell 66). To look at this we can use an activity system, or a “functional system of social/cultural interactions that constitutes behavior and produces that kind of change called learning” (Russell 68). In an activity system, a subject “interacts with tools over time on some object with some shared motive to achieve some outcome” (Russell 67). Because it views context as a functional system rather than a container, it sees learning as expanding involvement (Russell 68).

Parts of an activity system include: the subject, an individual or group engaged in an activity, the object, the material or space on which the subject acts, the motive, the object or focus of activity, the outcome, and the tools, anything that mediates subjects’ actions on objects (Russell 69-70). Also, we may include the community, the conditions of all the other elements of the system, the division of labor, and rules into our recognition of the activity system (Russell 70-71). Clearly, though, not every situation can be clearly defined as an activity system and there can be various contradictions. Russell mentions that contradictions can occur between and among any of the elements in a system (71).

I also really enjoyed Ding’s illustration of an activity system when applied to NIH Grant Writing. It really helped me to identify the different parts of one by using a real and tangible example. It makes such a tough idea much easier to grasp.

Learning & the Activity System
Learning is not a neat transfer of information, but a complex network of tool-mediated human relationships that we must look at according to shared social and cultural practices (Russell 73). It takes place in both formal educational settings and informal settings (Ding 4).Russell introduces zones of proximal development to describe the difference between what one can do alone and with assistance (73). This helps illustrate that learning is social and takes place as people use tools and mutual change themselves and those tools (73).

Russell argues that activity theory “can have heuristic value for planning and ‘trouble-shooting’ redesigns of distributed learning” (80). He comments that activity theory is helpful for learning because it sees it as expanding involvement over time, both social and intellectual, with the people and tools in culture (65). It is useful because it “looks beyond the individual learner, the interface and the ‘material’ to understand the social and material relations that affect complex human learning, people’s interactions with others as mediated by tools, including symbols” (65). Activity theory offers three new perspectives: multilevelness, or the ability to look at issues on different levels in a framework, interaction and social contexts, and development and changes in human practices (Ding 9).

Furthermore, effective learning can occur through teaching the genre system instead of specific genres (Ding 43). While this requires a lot from the teacher and is highly demanding and time consuming, it can be more affective than traditional practices looking at target genres (Ding 43). To further illustrate how activity theory can be helpful in learning, Ding adds that the integration of cognitive and social apprenticeships enable systematic and consistent incorporation of learning resources (4). Cognitive apprenticeship emphasizes context and situation (Ding 7). Social apprenticeship stresses learning in informal settings (8).

Questions & Comments:
One thing that struck my attention is that Ding points out that teaching actual genre systems rather than specific target genres is very demanding. It requires understanding, familiarity, collaboration, careful planning, and constant revision in pedagogical practices (Ding 43). However, is this really realistic? Today’s types of education seem to focus on being more holistic and at the same time teachers have to cover a broad range of information in most classes. They cannot always teach this specific. So, is this view then only helpful in some cases? I think that it may take too long and too much effort. While it may be worth it, it does not seem easy to do or realistic in the current situation; it may be something teachers need to develop and ease into over time.

With a clearer view of what activity systems are, I can definitely see how it could be useful to instructional designers and teachers in helping facilitate learning. There are obviously a variety of complex elements associated in learning environments today, particularly with all the added technologies. This seems like a helpful way to delineate the factors in play and assess how they may affect, influence, be advantageous, or interfere in certain situations.